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GEO-POLITICAL INSIGNIFICANCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND
ECONOMIC SURVIVAL: AN
UNOFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE FROM
WITHIN THE CARIBBEAN REGION
Dr. Christopher Malcolm*
"Dearly beloved we are gathered here today to think about this thing
called . . . life." PRINCE AND THE REVOLUTION, LET'S GO

CRAZY (Purple Rain 1984)

THIS

I. INTRODUCTION

perspective is personal and reflects individual thoughts, in-

cluding some that have been shared in public fora, which have occupied my mind at one time or another over the last several years.
While the ideas here included are not novel and could also be reflective
of what can be read elsewhere, the narrow geographic focus of this perspective is the Commonwealth Caribbean region.
The introduction to the song "Let's Go Crazy," which has been referenced above, could, without more, appear out of sync. But, the sentiment
is indeed well placed, and this perspective will seek to highlight, even if it
does not flesh out, some of the things called life considerations that
should be borne in mind when new approaches or mechanisms are being
implemented elsewhere in the hemisphere, with implications for the
Commonwealth Caribbean.
II.

CONTEXT

The Commonwealth Caribbean comprises several jurisdictions that are
not homogenous in their stages of development, economic dependence
models, financial and regulatory systems, population sizes, or governance
mechanisms. The region includes, for example, the member states of
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CARICOM,' which, but for Montserrat, are independent states, as well
as the Overseas Territories (OTs), 2 including Montserrat, which are still,
in substance, colonies of the United Kingdom, albeit called by another
name. The GDP of Trinidad and Tobago relies most significantly on oil
and natural gas, the Bahamas most significantly on tourism, and the Virgin Islands depends mostly on revenue derived from the financial services
sector.
Notwithstanding that the region is not homogenous, without inward
foreign investment in one shape or form every economy here would
crumble. To this extent, homogeneity can be inferred. This also means
that exogenous factors, in particular those affecting how money flows and
those relating to the financial regulatory mechanisms that apply elsewhere, have significant implications for the region. Furthermore, over
time there has been an established reliance on the fortunes of the U.S.
economy, which speaks to another level at which homogeneity can be
inferred. For example, notwithstanding that the Virgin Islands is a British
OT, its legal tender is the U.S. dollar and its established trading and associated economic relations with the United States are more significant
than they are with the United Kingdom.
Insofar as Trinidad and Tobago is concerned, investment in its oil and
gas economy, as well as its external market for output, is United States
centered. Where tourism is most important, such as in the Bahamas and
Barbados, arrivals from the United States dominate, and the product being offered is usually driven by U.S. market conditions. Insofar as cultural industries are concerned, the primary external, and often most
lucrative, target market for regional singers and musicians is the United
States. And those who target and even become more successful in Europe and elsewhere tend to break internationally through the U.S.
market.
Against this background, it may be considered well established that the
lives and livelihoods of the peoples of the Commonwealth Caribbean are
intricately bound to the United States. Accordingly, as we consider this
thing called life in the western hemisphere, it is important to bear in mind
that the leadership and active support of the United States are critical to
the economies of the region.
Since the beginning of the global financial crises in 2007, there has been
a growing tendency, or so it appears, to find fault in business models that
enable homeland nationals to include offshore legal arrangements in their
development plans. Whether financial planning options are included or
1. The member states of CARICOM are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia,
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and
Tobago. CARICOM Member States, CARRIBEAN COMMUNIfY (CARICOM) SE-c
RIETARIAr, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member-states.jsp?menu=com-

munity (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
2. The OTs in the Commonwealth Caribbean are Anguilla, the Virgin Islands, the
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. See id.
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not, these legal arrangements represent the essence of capitalism, and related offshore corporations enable investor-determined best arrangements for capital formation, market penetration, and risk allocation. At
the core, offshore corporations highlight the principle of separate legal
personality, and those who undermine these structures and the flexibility
they offer are inflicting what could become fatal wounds to the concept of
globalization, as well as the lure of the market economy.
While the principle of separate legal personality has evolved over time,
as applied in the Commonwealth Caribbean this legal fiction still affirms
that individual members of a corporation do not bear joint and several
responsibility for its authorized acts or omissions. The principle is well
established under company law statutes and has been judicially confirmed
since 1897, per Salomon v. Salomon.3
In Salomon, the court had to determine, in particular, whether the
creditors of an insolvent company could recover outstanding debts from
its shareholders. At first instance, in the High Court, Vaughan Williams,
J. gave judgment for the claimant, Mr. Broderip, 4 after having determined that the company was Mr. Salomon in another form and that
against him there was a right of indemnity. The Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment of Williams, J., albeit on the ground that Mr. Salomon had abused the privileges of incorporation and of limited liability,
which Parliament had intended for bona fide shareholders unlike Mr. Salomon, who was a mere puppet. In substance, the Court of Appeal found
that the company was a myth and a mere scheme that enabled Mr. Salomon to carry on as before but with limited liability. 5
The House of Lords, now the U.K. Supreme Court, unanimously overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal, and, in so doing, rejected the
argument that the company had been Mr. Salomon's agent. The House of
Lords also found that the company was duly constituted and that it was
not the function of judges to read into the statute limitations which they
considered expedient. In substance, they confirmed that the company was
a separate legal person from its shareholders/members. 6
Since this House of Lords decision, there have been various exceptions
to the principle confirmed therein. Courts have, for example, disregarded
a company's separate legal personality or lifted the corporate veil where
the company has been used as an instrument of fraud or to commit
crimes. Nevertheless, Salomon is still considered by many to be the most
important and time-honored decision in English company law. Furthermore, its core principle has since been a significant facilitative component
of the market economy, without which, capitalism, as we now know it,
could not exist.
3. Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., Ltd., [1897] 2 A.C. 22 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
4. Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323.
5. Salomon, [1897] 2 A.C. 22.
6. Id.
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Unfortunately, in recent years there has been a sustained 'global' push
towards greater 'transparency,' which, if unchecked, will put to death the
legal personality framework of a statutory limited liability company in the
several jurisdictions of the Commonwealth Caribbean. This march of
death could also mark the beginning of the end of capital formation and
risk allocation under a corporate vehicle as we now know it. If not certain
death, the current push will certainly cause an irreversible, and as yet
unquantifiable, undermining of the modern company, especially in its appeal to non-national members; and the important market economy function that it has served could be stymied if not lost.
Although it is quite proper to examine the fundamentals of any company, and to then determine whether it is being properly operated in accordance with its governing articles and the relevant laws under which it
was established, there will be cause for concern where it appears that
there is a more sinister motive at play. In this context, it is instructive that
the period of sustained chipping away of the protective layers of the company has corresponded with a period of sustained layering of 'global regulatory requirements' to protect against the possibility of money
laundering and terrorism financing.
In principle, money laundering and terrorism financing cannot be supported. As always, however, the devil is in the details, and it goes without
saying that the concepts of money laundering and terrorist financing are
not always understood in the same way by all persons. Beyond this philosophical debate, it may appear from a cursory glance at the international
media, and even some articles that purport to be written from an academic perspective, that these phenomena are, in substance, problems of
the developing world and that their continued negative implications are
being actively supported by international financial centers. In reality, this
perception, where held, is as far from the truth as distance could possibly
measure.
In fact, the real statistics would likely show, for example, that more
'dirty money' passes through London and New York each day than
through all other international financial centers combined. It is important
to recall, for example, that at the time of the BCCI scandal, one of the
'culprits' openly questioned why he was a target. He argued that he had
done nothing that is not done in every major international bank every
day. His fault, he could have concluded, was to breach the eleventh commandment - thou shall not get caught.
It can be said, without fear of contradiction, that major financial transactions anywhere in the developing world are directed from or supported
by mechanisms in the developed world. Therefore, as with arms control,
effective policing of money laundering or terrorism financing must be
controlled from the developed world. It follows also that any impression
given, express or implied, that the developing world, and in particular
international financial centers, is the real culprit in the fight against
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money laundering and terrorist financing should be rejected without the
possibility of serious opposing argument.
On their face, 'global regulatory requirements' do not discriminate
against any jurisdiction in preference of others. But it is not easy to justify
that such requirements are in fact global in their design, and experience
has shown that their implementation and related cost implications are
more unfavorable to small jurisdictions and those jurisdictions' small financial institutions. Furthermore, it could appear to an innocent bystander that the 'standards' setting process is unduly influenced by a
select group of major jurisdictions, and that their transgressions, even if
improperly labeled that way, are more easily forgiven or simply
overlooked.
There is no apparent end in sight to the constant layering of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) influenced
regulatory requirements. Worse, no real performance audit of these requirements has ever been conducted. While strong arguments are made
by flag-bearers to justify ongoing review and supporting implementation
of these requirements, no credible empirical data has ever been presented
in their defense. In addition, no analysis has ever been presented to show
that the regulations that are being implemented will ever prevent the ills
that they have been designed to cure. In fact, the need for constant
change is the surest indicator that the process is hit or miss, with miss
having been the more common result.
III.

GEOPOLITICAL INSIGNIFICANCE

While the Cold War was being 'fought,' the United States was the acknowledged super power in the West and the Soviet Union (USSR) was
the acknowledged super power in the so-called Eastern Bloc. Each super
power then sought to maintain strategic outposts in the 'backyard' of the
other or, at the very least, to ensure that its backyard did not fall prey to
the outpost ambitions of the other. Given its geographic location, the
Caribbean region was of strategic importance to both super powers. On
the one hand, the United States would have considered real or perceived
control within the region by the USSR to be interference in its zone of
influence and an imminent danger that could not be tolerated. On the
other hand, the USSR would have considered having significant socioeconomic, political, and military influence in the backyard of the United
States as a desirable objective.
For the United States, the risk of danger was exacerbated as Cuba,
which had before then been subject to significant direct or indirect U.S.
influence, was now ideologically and otherwise aligned to the USSR. To
add insult to injury, Cuba was promoting communism and closer association with the Eastern Bloc, some have argued as a surrogate for the
USSR, than to the Caribbean region and Latin America more generally.
Even if this was not clearly articulated, there was also a period during the
Cold War when Caribbean states were required to be either with or
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against the United States. If not with the United States, the offending
states were considered, by their nationals, to be tending towards communism. This perception, and the fear it induced, was often the subject of
intense media debate or scrutiny and even a dint of socialism was often
considered to be evidence of communism.
The stakes appear to have been higher than they are today, and this
was reflected in the extent to which the super powers were intimately
involved in the socio-economic affairs of the region. It does appear, from
a cursory examination, that the USSR, through their surrogate Cuba
where necessary, gifted more major infrastructure to the region than did
the United States.7 But it also appears that the trading relations that developed between the United States and the Caribbean, except with Cuba,
against which a U.S. trade embargo is still in force, were better sustained
over the long term. During the Cold War there was perceived, even if not
real, possibility for trade-offs between the USSR and the United States.
Now, with the Cold War at an end, the geographic and strategic citing of
the Caribbean is not as critical. Consequently, the erstwhile perceived
capacity to influence external resource allocation, by reference to geography, has crystallized to naught.
In any event, the era of fundamental socio-political divide on ideological bases has also apparently come to an end. Radical communism is now
as good as dead; and rabid capitalism has been tempered over time by
elements of socialism. Even corporations, which are at the core of capitalism, have allowed the concept of corporate social responsibility to take
root in recent years. It has been shown, for example, that corporations
that implement and adhere to corporate social responsibility best practices are generally more appealing to consumers. They also benefit from
greater workforce satisfaction, productivity uplifts, and enhanced resilience in tough times.
As the tendency towards ideological neutrality became more prominent so did the relative geopolitical insignificance of the Caribbean region. It is worth noting, for example, that during the last U.S.
presidential election campaign the socio-economic wellbeing of the Commonwealth Caribbean appeared to have been of little or no significance
to either the now re-elected President Barack Obama or his then challenger Mitt Romney. Furthermore, over the last several years, when the
Caribbean has figured in a high-level debate or a significant media blitz,
the usual context has been when arguing that the international financial
centers within the region have an undermining effect on U.S. tax revenue
and on its economy more generally.
Invariably, the arguments supporting death for international financial
centers do not sufficiently consider that these centers have, over time,
enabled, and still enable, efficient capital formation, offshore market penetration, and risk allocation for the continuing benefit of Western econo7. This infrastructure has included an international airport in Grenada and several
schools, including the Jose Marti Technical High School in Jamaica.

2013]1

GEO-POLITICAL INSIGNIFICANCE

29

mies. 8 In a sense, it is like arguing against reparations for slavery without
ascribing net present value to the once thriving slave economy or acknowledging that there is wealth now being enjoyed by some that would
not have materialized without the benefit of slavery.
While the reference to slavery is clearly tangential, it nevertheless
brings into focus that what was once important can, if vigilance is not
observed and genuine concern exhibited, be revised out of importance.
Furthermore, when examined in the context of current approaches to the
Commonwealth Caribbean more generally, and in relation to their international financial centers in particular, it appears that ongoing significance is but a measure of how well the arrangement in question now
serves the needs of those who require or once have it. Memories are
often short, and historical value, though important, is usually trumped by
knee-jerk or even well-considered responses favoring the here and now.
While the undermining of globalization of financial and related services, insofar as such globalization relies on international financial centers, is being actively promoted in a supposed attempt to protect the
economies of developed states, it is instructive that the undermining impact of globalization of sugar and banana production has not been considered as important at the head table. Furthermore, the phasing out of
trade and related preferences to the manifest detriment of small Caribbean economies has been met with what appears to be an 'accept and get
on with it' attitude from the head table. While this paper will not seek to
justify trade preferences, the historical import and what must be considered to have been a conscience-centered mechanism to justify avoidance
of reparations cannot be overlooked. In any event, the circumstances
under which such preferences were agreed to be phased out, and which
effectively hammered the final nail in the sugar and banana coffin, indicate that affected jurisdictions in the Commonwealth Caribbean had very
little influence at the head table where the burial order was signed.
In short, the Commonwealth Caribbean is now what it has always
been-several dots on a map with limited capacity to influence decisionmaking, including in relation to decisions that affect the lives and livelihoods of their nationals. Where once there might have been Cold War
enhanced capacity to affect external resource allocation, that era has ended. Accordingly, until there is a major shift in global power dynamics,
without overly supportive U.S. policies towards the Commonwealth Caribbean, including in relation to how the international financial centers are
treated, regional capacity for sustainable development could be frozen at
naught or, at best, next to naught.

8. Kerry Anderson, Why You Should Choose the BVI For Your Fund, BVI FINANCa
(Oct. 2012), http://www.bviifc.gov.vg/newsletter/2012/article.octchoosebvi.html.
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IV. INFORMATION SHARING AND ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
The business of banking and financial services has always thrived on
data capture. In an era where banks and other financial institutions were
smaller and more community-oriented, data capture was easy and often
driven by personal knowledge. Accordingly, there was no need for sophisticated underlying systems to capture and manage data. But, as institutions became larger and more global in their outlook, as well as in their
operations, reliance on personal knowledge for data capture could no
longer suffice. Over time, banks and other financial institutions became
multinational and had to implement an intricate web of underlying datadriven support systems for effective management and control.
In this new dispensation, there is an inherent risk of cross-jurisdictional
contagion from systemic failure in one jurisdiction. In addition, the interconnected operational mechanisms across jurisdictions now make it easier to transfer funds, including illicit gains, from one place to another. In
short, the information age has matured, or at the very least tended to
mature, the financial sector, and with maturity it has become even more
important for gate-keepers to act responsibly and to, where necessary,
implement robust management and related systems for data capture and
control. Unfortunately, robust could have the appearance of heavyhandedness and worse could, if vigilance is not observed, be discriminatory in substance and effect.
The most well developed systems for data capture and control in the
financial sector require that institutions know their customers as well as
their customers' customers. KYC, as the industry knows it, and related
requirements to profile customers and, where necessary, report upon
their 'suspicious' transactions is costly and often generates more data
than the supporting underlying analysis systems can manage.
At the industry level, the approach to KYC, and in particular the reporting requirements, cannot be standardized. Even though there may
be standard requirements at the jurisdictional level, there are requirement variations across jurisdictions. Implementation relies upon subjective input, which will vary across, and even within, institutions as well as
across implementation regimes more generally.
The KYC shortcomings notwithstanding, there is general agreement
that data capture, verification of such data, and subsequent analysis is
necessary for functional efficiency as well as to assure, more generally,
that the financial system is properly serving its intended intermediation
purpose. The concern will ordinarily focus on whether what is required is
in fact fit for the purpose, and if, in a cost-benefit analysis, such requirements are justified. In this latter regard, much has been said to support
the reporting requirement, but little has been done that would, flowing
from a credible performance audit, justify that the several additional layers of information that are required from time to time do in fact serve a
laudable purpose.
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If it is indeed the case, for example, that much of what is provided is
incapable of credible analysis, and merely results in information overload,
then it could be cynically concluded that the real purpose being served is
the creation of jobs for data capture and related service providers. For
example, when prohibition of illicit drugs was introduced in the United
States during the 1930s it was indicated that prohibition would undermine
that industry and cure related social ills within a generation. Since then,
the industry has grown and related social ills have multiplied. In the same
breath, several feeder or beneficiary industries, such as the illegal arms
trade, the cutting agent business, legal support services, and addiction
counseling services, have burgeoned in circumstances where the purpose
of prohibition has not been and may never be met.
In its role as a 'global standards setting agency,' the Financial Action
Task Forum has been involved in an ever-expanding program that often
requires urgent, time-consuming, and expensive implementation of antimoney laundering and counter-terrorism measures at a national level. Insofar as the Commonwealth Caribbean is concerned, effective implementation is monitored through the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
(CFATF). The CFATF program generally requires enactment of new domestic legislation, and each jurisdiction is subject to ongoing peer review
to assure compliance. Where deficiencies are identified, urgent corrective measures are required, and there is an ultimate threat of black listing
for 'recalcitrant' jurisdictions.
Experience has shown that there is unevenness in the peer review
mechanism, and, in any event, the threat, and even the action, of black
listing is more detrimental to some jurisdictions than it is to others. When
measuring the likely impact of black listing, for example, it must surely be
concluded that its substantive effect on the United States, which has the
reserve currency that most international financial transactions must be
settled in and is the world's largest economy, has to be less than it would
be for the Virgin Islands, which does not have its own currency but instead uses the U.S. dollar. The Virgin Islands also has a domestic economy that relies primarily on revenue derived from the financial services
sector.
From an implementation perspective, it is also clear that the playing
field cannot be level. It must always be kept in mind that the essential
functions of government are the same in large as well as small jurisdictions. Even the core cost implications related to the implementation of
any measure will likely be the same across jurisdictions. Where there are
large government bureaucracies, specialization can be developed and
there are more hands on deck to undertake critical research and to get
the job completed. Insofar as the Commonwealth Caribbean is concerned, while the size of governments could, in some instances, be considered large relative to population size, the institutional frameworks cannot
and do not in fact sustain large numbers of specialists, including legislative drafters.
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It is not unusual for a government drafting unit in the Commonwealth
Caribbean to include just a single legislative drafter, and, in many instances, drafters are available only under externally funded consultancies.
Notwithstanding this lacuna, the business of government must continue.
At the same time, scarce resources must also be spent to continuously
update laws that secure the CFATF and other requirements in circumstances where the real substantive value may simply be to avoid black
listing and its negative implications.
In 2009, the United States enacted the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). This law will have extra territorial reach, and, when
operational, will require that offshore financial institutions holding accounts for U.S. nationals, whether such accounts are held by individuals
or through companies, with balances above a prescribed limit, will have
to make specified disclosure to the U.S. authorities. The information provided will then be analyzed for U.S. tax collection purposes. If disclosures are not made in the manner prescribed, or otherwise agreed, the
United States retains the right to take such action as they deem appropriate to secure or at least assure that required tax payments have been
made. In each case offshore financial institutions will be required to drill
down as necessary to ensure that corporations, trusts, and other such devices are not used to avoid U.S. tax liability.
FATCA is now scheduled to become operational by 2014. In the interim, financial institutions will have to undertake a cumbersome, timeconsuming, and very expensive system and training overhaul to secure
their readiness for compliance. There is a heavy financial burden for implementation, which will, based on Ernst & Young estimates, cost each
institution approximately $30mm. Furthermore, deliberate or even inadvertent failure to provide the required information could cause a recalcitrant financial institution to suffer corporate liability. The cost and related
implications could get worse as the United Kingdom is expected to follow
with its own version of FATCA, and continental Europe could follow
soon thereafter.
Notwithstanding the obvious burden of compliance and that the substantive value to regional jurisdictions may not be easily justified, the
ongoing legislative adjustments that are required under 'global regulations' must be implemented. Even where implementation could, for example, offend constitutional provisions and accordingly require
fundamental change, the general attitude from outside nations underscores that such impediments are problems of the jurisdiction under review to be addressed without unnecessary delay. The question often
asked from within, even if not clearly or forcefully articulated, is: would a
similar and perhaps equally heavy-handed approach be applied to every
jurisdiction?
In essence, while there is much that could be complained about, this
business of life is about survival. Where, as in the case of the Commonwealth Caribbean, there are limited options for sustainable development,
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less-than-ideal could appear, and will often be considered, a most viable,
in the circumstances, option. As is, staying in the game requires information sharing, which may or may not be on desirable bases. Against this
background, whatever steps are necessary, however onerous and unjustified they may be or appear to be, are usually implemented in the interest
of economic survival.
V.

CLOSING COMMENTS

This thing called life in the Commonwealth Caribbean is an ongoing
struggle for survival. The region cannot sustain itself and, in real terms, is
at the mercy of exogenous factors, over which it has little or no control.
Insofar as the hemispheric balance of power is concerned, it is often said,
and experience has shown, that if the United States coughs the region
catches a cold.
Given this background, it can be concluded that the economic and related wellbeing of the Commonwealth Caribbean is fragile. Furthermore,
given the trading balance of power that the United States wields in this
hemisphere and beyond, it is also clear that sustained development here
depends, in large measure, on ongoing and concerned U.S. support for
the region. Accordingly, as the United States contemplates, implements,
or supports any measure, if the best interest of the Commonwealth Caribbean is spared a thought, it will vigilantly advocate on behalf of its hemispheric 'dependents' in the region.
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